TOLSTOI AND THE MEANING OF LIFE1
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A. Tolstoi begins by explaining that he was both baptized and raised in the Orthodox Christian faith. "But when I abandoned the second course at the University at the age of eighteen I no longer believed any of the things I had been taught" (p. 3). Tolstoi's loss of faith came about not as the result of any spiritual struggle but seemed to have been rather a recognition of the fact that he had never really had and lived by any real Christian conviction. In his late teens and for most of his twenties he lived the sort of life that was expected of an aristocrat of his country and period. Then he took up with literature: "faith in the meaning of poetry and in the development of life was a religion, and I was one of its priests" (p. 9). He recognized that his fellow professional writers were a poor lot. Nevertheless: "I naively imagined that I was a poet and artist and could teach everybody without myself knowing what I was teaching" (p. 10). Travel in Europe confirmed him in "the faith of striving after perfection" (p. 12). But in this period he suffered two traumata: he witnessed in Paris an execution by the guillotine; and his brother died young after a long and painful illness "not understanding why he had lived and still less why he had to die" (p. In the document which we are considering Tolstoi is speaking in his own person, and there is no similarly astringent comment.
Here and now what began as clinical autobiography is developing pretensions to wider insight into the depths of the supposedly universal human situation. Tolstoi is sliding from the merely autobiographical: "there were no wishes the fulfilment of which I could consider reasonable"; to the ostensibly objective conclusion that suffering and mortality really must withdraw all reasonableness from every attempt to satisfy any ordinary human desire. It is the notion of the meaninglessness of life which appears to provide the crucial middle term: if life is meaningless, then there can be no desires the fulfilment of which would be reasonable; but if there is nothing ahead but "suffering and real death," then life must be meaningless. Yet whatever plausibility this argument may have depends on interpreting this crucial middle term ambiguously: the basic sense for Tolstoi is that in which to say that life is meaningless is to say that there are no human desires the fulfilment of which would be reasonable; but sometimes, as in the present argument, the expression is also so construed as in effect simply to mean that life does end in "suffering and real death."
There is a price to be paid even for an unequivocal interpretation of "the meaninglessness of life" as equivalent to "the fact that all our lives end in suffering and real death." If we give the words this meaning then any attempt to press the question "What is the meaning of life?" must amount to a prejudicial insistence that after all we do not really suffer and die-or, at any rate, not finally. Similarly, to lament the meaninglessness of life will not be to lament something which may or may not be the tragic consequence of our mortality and possibility: it will be to express distress over just those very facts of the human condition. But the result of using the expression "the meaninglessness of life," as Tolstoi does, ambiguously, is to make it seem as if some reason had been given for taking it that the only truly deep and adequate response to the facts so labeled is a final decisive arrest of life by suicide. That is the conclusion of Section IV, although it is developed later in Section VII.
C. In Section V Tolstoi tells us how he proceeded to look for answers to his questions in the sciences, but unsuccessfully: "I sought in all the sciences, but far from finding what I wanted, became convinced that all who like myself had sought in knowledge for the meaning of life had found nothing" (p. 23). These questions are all, he thinks, fundamentally the same question, differently formulated. One, considered in IIA above, is: "Why should I live, why wish for anything, or do anything?" This, for reasons elucidated in IIB above, is taken to be the same thing as asking: "Is there any meaning in my life that the inevitable death awaiting me does not destroy?" (p. 24).
In Section VI, by way of Socrates and Schopenhauer Tolstoi reaches Ecclesiastes and the story of the Buddha's discovery of disease, death, and decay. For all this, except the reference to the Buddha, compare again the spiritual struggles of Levin in Anna Karenina. 7 In Section VII Tolstoi lists what he regards as the only four possible reactions to this supposed fact of the meaninglessness of life. The first, ignorance, is only for the naively innocent: it consists in "not understanding that life is an evil and an absurdity." This is out: "one cannot cease to know what one does know" (p. 39). The second, called epicureanism, is substantially that of the author of Ecclesiastes. Although "That is the way in which the majority of people of our circle make life possible for themselves," such epicureanism can, in Tolstoi's view, result only from shallowness and lack of imagination. This, again, is out: "I could not imitate these people; not having their dullness of imagination I could not artificially produce it in myself" (p. 40). The third option "is that of strength and energy." This consists in suicide. "I saw that this was the worthiest way of escape and I wished to adopt it" (p. 41). "The fourth way is that of weakness. It consists in seeing the truth of the situation and yet clinging to life, knowing that nothing will come of it" (p. 41). This was Tolstoi's own first response, as well as that of Pierre Bezhukov and Constantine Levin.
If these were merely the musings of some character in a novel they might perhaps be allowed to pass. Though even here it is as worthwhile as it is unfashionable to emphasize that if the novel or indeed creative literature generally is to be anything more than a pastime, then men of letters must be prepared for a criticism of content which presses beyond all purely literary and dramatic considerations. Certainly, presented as they are, as in part some contribution to our thinking about the problems of world outlook, Tolstoi's ideas categorically must be challenged. It just will not do at all to offer the facts, or supposed facts, of "suffering and real death" as if they must be, or would have to be, taken as compulsive reasons for deciding "that life is an evil and an absurdity." The fact that all lives contain evils gives no ground sufficient for inferring that all or even any lives are wholly or even predominantly evil. The fact that no life lives forever does not necessarily devalue all the possible activities and achievements of a lifetime.
Apparently Tolstoi was one of those inclined to hold, as if this were a necessary truth, that nothing can matter unless it goes on forever, or at any rate, eventually leads to something else which does. But there really is nothing at all ineluctable, or even especially profound, about this particular value commitment. It is at least no less rational to hold that it is precisely our mortality which makes what we do, or fail to do, so overwhelmingly important. What at this point struck Tolstoi so forcibly becomes paradoxical only when you take it, as he apparently does, that these simple people must somehow know something which has completely eluded his inquiry. This assumption can be seen in his saying that "there is a whole humanity that lived and lives as if it understood the meaning of its life, for without understanding it it could not live" (p. 43; italics mine). Now, of course, it clearly is true that these people have, in a sense, got something that Tolstoi then had not: for they are clearly not suffering from the condition which he so strikingly dubs "arrest of life." But, as we have seen, this condition is by no means a necessary response to, nor a necessary consequence of, a recognition of certain fundamental facts. He is, therefore, not warranted to assume that the absence of this pathological condition in the simplest folk, combined with the presence of a capacity to appreciate some trite reasonings, provides any sort of indication that they must possess knowledge of life's meaning, in the senses in which he has been employing that expression.
Simply by not suffering from arrests of life, and by being acquainted with such trite arguments, they do not show that they must possess some fount of secret knowledge-philosophical knowledge that and why his earlier reasonings are unsound, or metaphysical knowledge that after all we are not really mortal, or that suffering is somehow not what it seems. Nevertheless Tolstoi was not altogether wrong in thinking that there was something to be learned from the mere existence of such simple folk, unworried by his tormenting sense of cosmic futility. It might, for instance, lead one to suspect that there are flaws in his questions and in his arguments, which there are. It might also suggest that he could learn from these unsophisticated examples at least one way to escape from his psychological condition, as in fact he did. What we surely need here is Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing that; the peasants may indeed know how to live their lives free of all sophisticated psychological disabilities, but this by no means presupposes the possession of any theoretical knowledge not vouchsafed to their unfortunate social superiors.' E. In Section VIII Tolstoi tells how an independent force came to the rescue in his dissatisfactions: "something else was also working which I can only call a consciousness of life." This force dragged Tolstoi's attention away from "that narrow circle of rich, learned, and leisured people to which I belonged" and toward "the whole life of mankind that surrounded me on all sides" (p. 45). But he does not now want merely to break down what he has come to regard as his unhealthy isolation from the life of ordinary people. He begins to develop a mystique of the masses: "Rational knowledge, presented by the learned and wise, denies the meaning of life, but the enormous masses of men, the whole of mankind, receive that meaning in irrational knowledge. And that irrational knowledge is faith" (p. 47). This mystique later betrays him into some memorably unpersuasive utterances: "All that people sincerely believe in must be true; it may be differently expressed but it cannot be a lie, and therefore if it presents itself to me as a lie, that only means I have not understood it" (p. 68). It would surely be hard to find, even in the prophetic writings of D. H. Lawrence, anything more egregiously grotesque.
Yet Tolstoi was no wilful irrationalist. He was tormented by this apparent contradiction between the deliverances of reason and of faith: "By faith it appears that in order to understand the meaning of life I must renounce my reason, the very thing for which alone a meaning is required" (p. 47). He begins in Section IX to explore as a possible way to the resolution of his antinomy the idea that "rational knowledge" deals only with the finite, whereas "irrational knowledge" is always concerned with a relation between the finite and the infinite. But, like others who have tried to separate two exclusive spheres of influence, he finds difficulty both in determining appropriate territories and in maintaining the necessary barriers. At the end of Section IX, he writes: "I began to understand that in the replies given by faith is stored up the deepest human wisdom and that I had no right to deny them on the ground of reason, and that those answers are the only ones which reply to life's question" (p. 53). Yet at the beginning of Section X Tolstoi, like everybody else, finds himself confronted with rival faiths and rival interpretations; and he in fact resorts to some sort of rational criticism as the only sensible method of attempting to decide between their different claims.
It is with an account of the first stages of this process that the rest of A Confession is occupied; and in the whole period of his life to which this forms a prologue Tolstoi devoted himself to a strenuous, and radically protestant, study both of the Gospels and of systematical theologies. The upshot was something very far indeed from the uncritical and superstitious faith of a muzhik.
However, we are here concerned with all this only insofar as it bears on his argument about the meaning of life.
For present purposes what needs to be underlined once again is that the peasants who seem able to teach Tolstoi a lesson in how to live do not thereby and necessarily reveal any knowledge that something is the case. There is, therefore, no call, at least on this account, to search for some sphere of the infinite for such "irrational knowledge" to be about. Again, the secret of the peasants is not knowledge that the finite and the infinite are thus and thus arranged, but knowledge of how to go on living, and to allege that they-along surely with the despised epicureans and others-possess this sort of knowledge is in this case only another way of saying that they all enjoy rude mental health. Even if it were to be established that for some men, or for all men, to hold certain metaphysical beliefs is a condition of full well-being, this suspiciously Jungian fact would still have not the slightest tendency to show that any such therapeutic beliefs are actually true. The antinomy, which was at the end of Section VIII tormenting Tolstoi, thus disappears, not because "rational knowledge" and "irrational knowledge" tell the truth about different spheres, but because no sufficient reason has been provided for believing that the latter tells any truth at all. In her hierophantic exposition of the Tractatus Miss Anscombe urges that Wittgenstein cannot be interpreted as saying only the negative thing which he seems to be saying in the first four of the six sentences quoted: quite rightly, for the two following sentences are used to insist that there is after all something to be said, albeit something which unfortunately happens to be unsayable. She goes on to write of Tolstoi, "whose explanations of what he thought he understood are miserable failures; but whose understanding is manifested, and whose preaching comes through, in a story like Hadji Murad.""2 In the light of the whole previous argument it becomes possible to see that and how this is both partly right and partly wrong.
It is right in its suggestion that what
Tolstoi was seeking, and preaching, was primarily an attitude to life and a way of life; something combining dignity, realism, and peace of mind. It is wrong in assuming that such a way and such an attitude must be connected necessarily with some mystic truth: no good reason whatsoever has been given for believing that the peace of mind of Platon Karataev, and that eventually achieved by Pierre Bezhukov, by Constantine Levin, or by Hadji Murad either validates or presupposes logically any propositions about some infinite shadow world outside the world.
Indeed what should strike the ideologically minded reader is that although Murad was a Hadji-one, that is, who has made the great pilgrimage to Mecca -his character is not in fact presented as formed by the doctrines of Islam. Again, in War and Peace,. Pierre Bezhukov's "mental change" is not a conversion to a dogma-not even to an inexpressible dogma-but rather the acquisition of "that tranquillity of mind, that inner harmony, which had so impressed him in the soldiers at the battle of Borodino.1113 His newfound "faith" is a faith wholly devoid of intellectual content; and the "answers" which he now accepts are as empty as the original symptomatic "questions."i14 In Anna Karenina, similarly, Constantine Levin is not initiated into any truths necessary to salvation. Yet he too comes to feel that "my whole life, independently of anything that may happen to me, is in every moment no longer meaningless as it was before, but has an unquestionable meaning of goodness with which I have the power to invest it." ' The appreciation of this antithesis between the concern about a way of life and the discovery of mystic truth may provide a clue to a constructive understanding of Tolstoi's later religious teaching. We have seen how Tolstoi was "brought to acknowledge that all live humanity has another irrational knowledge-faith which makes it possible to live"; and this, at least in A Confession, he mistakes to be a knowledge that something is the case. Thus, though Miss Anscombe dismisses all his attempts to formulate this putative knowledge as "miserable failures", this description scarcely applies to the catechism: "What real result will come of my life?-Eternal torment or eternal bliss. What meaning has life that death does not destroy?-Union with the eternal God: heaven" (p. 50). But later, in such specifically religious works as the studies of the Gospels and What I Believe, this traditional doctrine seems to disappear; and the teaching is of a way of life, without benefit of any eschatological threats and promises. Indeed we seem to have there a religion which looks as if it really might be completely analyzable in terms of ethics and psychology only.
In the course of the recent revival of lay interest in the philosophy of religion it has been suggested that traditional Christianity might be analyzed in some such manner. Thus, in the early days, a writer in Mind urged: that "God exists" might be interpreted as "Csome men and women have had, and all may have, experiences called 'meeting God'"; and that "God created the world from nothing" should be construed as "everything which we call 'material' can be used in such a way that it contributes to the well-being of men." 16 More recently the somewhat more sophisticated proposal has been made that a religious assertion is to be taken as "the assertion of an intention to carry out a certain behaviour policy,
